Abstract. The shuffle index has been recently proposed for organizing and accessing data in outsourcing scenarios while protecting the confidentiality of the data as well as of the accesses to them. In this paper, we extend the shuffle index to the use of multiple servers for storing data, introducing a new protection technique (shadow) and enriching the original ones by operating in a distributed scenario. Our distributed shuffle index produces a significant increase in the protection of the system, with no additional costs.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an over increasing reliance on external services for data storage and management, towards the emerging cloud scenario, characterized by a rich and diverse availability of providers offering storage and computational functionalities. Together with data management functionality, the research and industrial communities have been investigating different solutions to ensure confidentiality of data whose management is outsourced to the cloud [8] . Complementing data confidentiality, more recent approaches have also considered protection of access and pattern confidentiality, which require to maintain confidential to the server storing the data the fact that a given access aims at a specific target or that two accesses aim at the same target. Among these approaches, the shuffle index [5] organizes data in a hierarchical encrypted data structure and provides access and pattern confidentiality by obfuscating accesses and dynamically changing the allocation of data to physical blocks, so to break the correspondence between data and locations where they are stored. Such a dynamic allocation prevents the server observing sequences of accesses from withdrawing inferences which could compromise pattern confidentiality and even break data confidentiality. The advantages of the shuffle index are the ability to support equality and range predicates in data retrieval, and the limited performance overhead compared with other access protection solutions [7] .
The availability of different providers for data outsourcing can help in providing protection in cloud scenarios and has been investigated in some proposals, adopting, for example, data fragmentation and slicing at different servers (e.g., [3, 16] ). The intuition is that relying on multiple servers (in contrast to a single one) for managing data or providing services naturally increases protection, since it diminishes the knowledge and visibility that each server has on the data and on accesses to them, and enjoys diversity of risks.
In this paper, we extend the shuffle index to operate with multiple servers for storing and accessing data. Every data access entails accessing the servers and shuffling data dynamically changing their allocation even across servers. Since retrieval of the targeted data may entail traversing the hierarchical structure across servers (i.e., a parent might be stored at one server and a children at another), we introduce a shadowing technique that ensures protection of this path information by making observations by each server as if the server was the only one involved in the access. The distribution of the shuffle index increases protection for data and accesses, quickly destroying knowledge that servers might have and effectively preventing the servers from acquiring knowledge by observing sequences of accesses. Such increased protection comes without impact on the system performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic concepts of the shuffle index on which we build. Section 3 extends the index organization to the adoption of multiple servers. Section 4 introduces shadows and extends the original protection techniques (covers, cache, and shuffling) to operate with them. Section 5 describes access execution. Section 6 discusses the protection offered by our approach illustrating how distributing the shuffle index provides greater confidentiality guarantees while not impacting performance. Section 7 illustrates related work. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Basic Concepts
A shuffle index [5] organizes the outsourced data as an abstract unchained B+-tree T a (N a ) (i.e., leaves are not connected in a linked list) with fan out F defined over a candidate key K, with actual data stored in the leaves of the tree. Each internal node of the index is a pair n a = values , children ∈ N a , where values is a list of q values with F 2 − 1 ≤ q ≤ F − 1 (the lower-bound does not apply to the root) ordered from the smallest to the greatest, and children is a list of q + 1 children. The first child of a node is the root of the subtree with all values v < values [1 ] ; the i-th child is the root of the subtree storing the values v such that Figure 1(a) illustrates an example of unchained B+-tree with fan out 3. For simplicity, we refer to the content of a node with a label (e.g., a), instead of explicitly reporting the values it represents. At the logical level , nodes are allocated to logical addresses that work as logical identifiers. Given an abstract unchained B+-tree T a (N a ), its logical representation T is a triple (N , ID, φ), with N a set of logical nodes, ID a set of logical identifiers, and φ : N a → ID a bijective function that associates a logical identifier with each abstract node. Note that the possible order among identifiers does not necessarily correspond to the order in which nodes appear in the value-ordered abstract representation. Each non-leaf abstract node n a = values , children in N a is represented by a logical node n= id , vals , ptrs in N , with id =φ(n a ), vals =values , and ptrs [j]=φ(children [j]), j = 0, . . . , q. In fact, pointers to the children of the nodes in the abstract unchained B+-tree are translated, at the logical level, into the identifiers of the corresponding child nodes. Analogously, each abstract leaf node n a = values , tuples in N a translates into a logical node n= id , vals , t that includes tuples t =tuples instead of pointers to children. Figure 1(b) illustrates an example of logical representation of the abstract index in Figure 1 (a). Logical identifiers are reported on the top of each node and, for easy reference, their first digit denotes its level in the tree.
At the physical level , logical identifiers are mapped to physical addresses and the shuffle index is represented by a set of disk blocks storing the nodes in the tree. Every node is encrypted by first prefixing it with a random salt and then applying symmetric encryption in CBC mode. Formally, each non-leaf node id , vals , ptrs ∈ N (leaf node id , vals , t ∈ N , resp.) is stored at block id ,b , where b=E k (salt ||id ||vals ||ptrs ) (b=E k (salt ||id ||vals ||t ), resp.), with E a symmetric encryption function, k the encryption key, and salt a nonce generated for each encryption. Figure 1(c) illustrates the physical representation of the logical index in Figure 1(b) , which corresponds to the view of the server.
The retrieval of the leaf block containing the tuple corresponding to a given index value (target value) requires an iterative process. Starting from the root of the tree and ending at a leaf, the client reads from the server the block in the path to the target, and decrypts the block for retrieving the address of the child to be read at the next step. To protect the fact that different accesses may aim at the same content, this iterative process is extended by:
-performing, in addition to the target search, other fake cover searches, guaranteeing indistinguishability of target and cover searches and operating on disjoint paths of the tree (retrieving, at every level of the tree, num cover +1 blocks at the same time); -maintaining a set of num cache nodes in a local cache for each level of the tree, but level 0; -mixing (shuffling) the content of all retrieved blocks as well as those maintained in cache, and overwriting them accordingly on the server.
Cover searches protect the confidentiality of accesses by introducing uncertainty on the leaf block target of the access (any of the accessed leaves could store the searched value). The cache makes searches repeated within a short time interval not recognizable as such. In fact, if the target of an access is in cache, the corresponding block is not read from the server (the target is substituted by an additional cover). Shuffling destroys the correspondence between nodes and the physical blocks where they are stored. (Note that at every reallocation, a node is encrypted with a different random salt.) Repeated accesses to the same block do not then imply repeated accesses to the same node. As an example of access to the shuffle index in Figure 1 , consider a search for c3 that adopts a1 as cover, and assume that the cache contains the path to b2 . The access visits the tree level by level. The client has the root r in cache, downloads and decrypts blocks 102 and 103 from the server, shuffles and encrypts nodes a, b, and c (e.g., allocating a to 102, b to 101, and c to 103), and overwrites blocks 101, 102, and 103 at the server. At the leaf level, the client downloads and decrypts blocks 202 and 207, shuffles and encrypts nodes a1 , b2 , and c3 , and overwrites blocks 202, 205, and 207 at the server. Figure 1(c) illustrates the observations on the access at the server in terms of blocks read and/or written. Note that the root (being in cache) is only written. The server cannot detect which among the accessed leaves is the target of the access and how the content of blocks has been shuffled.
Distributed Shuffle Index
In a distributed shuffle index , the data owner exploits more than one server for storing and managing data, enjoying then increased protection of data, access, and pattern confidentiality by dynamically changing the allocation of the nodes also across the servers. For simplicity, we illustrate our distributed shuffle index assuming the use of two servers, with the note that the approach can be easily extended to the consideration of an arbitrary number of servers. For simplicity of notation and clarity of the figures, we denote our servers by S G and S Y , coloring nodes stored at them with Green and Yellow , respectively (in b/w printouts, Green is the darker color).
The consideration of more than one server for the allocation of an abstract index and for accesses to it requires revising the shuffle index structure discussed in Section 2 with the following extensions.
-Abstract level . The root r a of a distributed shuffle index is extended to have twice the capacity as the other nodes. Hence, for an index with fan out F , the root can contain up to 2F −1 values (in contrast to the original F −1 ). In the translation to the logical level, the abstract root r a = values , children will be interpreted as two abstract root nodes, r 
The result of function φ over an abstract node, determining the logical identifier of the node, therefore determines also the server at which the abstract node is stored. Function φ guarantees the natural requirement to store r a 0 and r a 1 at different servers. Formally, φ(r a 0 )∈ID X and φ(r a 1 )∈ID Z , with X, Z ∈ {Y, G} and X = Z. In the following, given a node n in the set N of logical nodes, we will use σ(n.id ) to denote the server at which the node is stored. Formally, given n = id , vals , ptrs , with
-Physical level . It works like in the original shuffle index, storing (according to allocation function φ defined at the logical level) nodes at each server in encrypted form as described in Section 2. Figure 2 illustrates an example of abstract, logical, and physical distributed shuffle index. For simplicity and easy reference, logical identifiers start with a letter denoting the server where the corresponding block is stored (G for S G and Y for S Y ) and nodes stored at server S G and S Y are color-coded (Green and Yellow ). In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that the physical address of a block corresponds to the logical identifier of the node it stores. Also, we use the term node to refer to an abstract content and block to refer to a specific memory slot in the logical/physical structure. When either terms can be used, we will use node/block interchangeably. 
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Shadows
Retrieval of a target key value in a distributed shuffle index entails traversing the index starting from the root ancestor of the target and following, at every node, the pointer to the child in the path to the leaf possibly containing the target value. Such a path can naturally involve nodes stored at any of the servers. For instance, with reference to the shuffle index in Figure 2 a search for target value e3 involves access to blocks (G001/Y001;G103;Y205), with G001 and G103 stored at S G , and Y001 and Y205 stored at S Y . (For simplicity, we assume both roots to be always accessed.) Like in the original shuffle index proposal, we assume each server, which initially knows only the number of blocks it stores, to potentially have knowledge of the height of the shuffle index and of the level of the node stored at each of its blocks (which can be acquired by observing the iterations in the accesses). Combined with such knowledge, discontinuity of accesses with respect to levels (e.g., for S Y ) could leak information to the servers. To avoid such a leakage, in our approach, every time we need to access a block at one of the servers, we will also access another block, which we call shadow , at the other server. With shadows, each server will observe accesses to blocks as if it was the only one storing the data structure and involved in the access. With respect to this aspect, any block at the other server at the same level as the block for which it works as shadow would do. The choice of the shadow for a block during a given access, however, needs to take into account the fact that the shuffle index changes allocation of nodes at every access. Re-allocating a node n requires changing in its parent the pointer to n, to refer to the block where it has been moved. Therefore, the nodes involved in an access should always form a sub-tree. In other words, a shadow at a given level should be child of a node that is available for the access (i.e., read in the path to the target or to a cover, or available in cache).
A convenient way to ensure this requirement is to use, as shadow of a node for a given access, one of its siblings stored at the other server. For each node n, we call far siblings of n the children of the same parent (i.e., n's siblings) stored at a server different from the one where n is stored. We denote with FS (n) the nodes having such properties at a given time with respect to a node n, as formally defined in the following.
Definition 1 (Far siblings and shadow). Let T(N , ID G , ID Y , φ) be a logical index, and n be a non-root node in N . The far siblings of node n, denoted FS(n), are defined as FS (n) = {n i ∈ N : parent(n i ) = parent(n) and σ(n i .id ) = σ(n.id )}. As particular cases, FS(r 0 ) = {r 1 } and FS (r 1 ) = {r 0 }. The shadow of a node for a given access is one of its far siblings selected for the specific access.
For instance, with reference to the shuffle index in Figure 2 (b), FS (e) = {f , h}, and FS (e3 )={e2 }. Assuming to choose h and e2 as shadows for e and e3 , respectively, the search for key value e3 will translate into accessing blocks (G001;G103;G202) at S G and blocks (Y001;Y104;Y205) at S Y .
Note that the far siblings relationship is dynamic as every re-allocation of nodes, which will operate across servers, changes it. Also, the shadow relationship is dynamic as, at any given access to a node, any of its far siblings can be dynamically selected to serve as shadow. Although in principle nodes can be randomly allocated to servers, distributing allocation uniformly provides better protection and has the advantage that the set FS (n) of a node n can never be empty. We then require uniform distribution between the two servers among the children of each node (storing half of the node's children at one server and half at the other). The allocation function φ must enforce a balanced allocation of nodes' children to the servers, satisfying the following property.
T satisfies the balanced allocation property iff:
1. σ(r 0 .id ) = σ(r 1 .id ) (i.e., the two roots are stored at a different server); 2. ∀ id , vals , ptrs ∈N : |card(ptrs G ) − card(ptrs Y )|≤ 1, with ptrs G ={id i ∈ptrs :
The first condition in the property states that the two roots are stored at different servers. The second condition states that, for each node, half of its children are stored at server S G and the other half at server S Y . Property 1 guarantees that every node n, child of a node with k children, has at least k 2 far siblings. It is easy to see that the distributed shuffle index in Figure 2 obeys to the balanced allocation property.
Covers
As in the original proposal, cover searches are fake searches executed in parallel with the search for the target value to the aim of hiding the target request within a group of other requests. The fact that the shuffle index is distributed has two effects with respect to covers: one is the extension of the definition of cover search, the other is the application of shadows to covers.
As in [5] , the only constraint on covers chosen for an access is that they actually act as such, that is, they should be indistinguishable from actual searches, and their paths should not intersect or intersect the path to the target. The first aspect is already guaranteed from [5] , the latter aspect simply requires extending the definition of cover searches to the consideration of the fact that the root is split, and therefore the constraint that paths of the covers have only the root in common translates into requiring that their paths have nothing in common but -possibly -any of the roots, as formally stated by the following definition. Note that the nodes in the paths to covers can be indifferently stored at one of the two servers. This does not create any problem in our approach. In fact, just like the target, covers will also be shadowed and for every node to be accessed in the path to a cover at a server, one of its far siblings will be accessed at the other server. In particular, for each level in the shuffle index, if a node n c in the path to a cover is actually stored at a different server from the node n t in the path to the target, n c will act as a protection of n t 's shadow and n c 's shadow will act as a protection for n t , respectively, at the two servers. The application of shadows to nodes in the path to covers nicely provides a symmetric behavior at the two servers, regardless of where these nodes are stored. In fact, a server will observe access to num cover + 1 different blocks for each level, but level 0.
As an example, consider the distributed shuffle index in Figure 2 (b), and a search for e3 (path (r 1 ;e;e3 )), using a2 as cover (path (r 0 ;a;a2 )). Assuming to choose, in the set of its far siblings, h as shadow for e, c for a, e2 for e3 , and a1 for a2 , the accessed blocks are (G001;G102,G103;G202,G207) at S G and (Y001;Y103,Y104;Y205,Y213) at S Y .
Cache
Caching works essentially like in the original proposal, maintaining a copy of the last num cache target searches (where for each target search all nodes in the path to the target leaf are maintained). In addition to the actual targets, in our distributed scenario, we also store, in association with every node n in the path to the target, the node n that acted as n's shadow last time n was accessed.
Formally, the cache of a distributed shuffle index is defined as follows.
be a logical index with height h. A cache of size num cache for T is a layered structure of h+1 sets Cache 0 , . . . , Cache h of pairs of nodes where:
1. Cache 0 contains pair r i ,r j with i, j ∈ {0, 1} and i = j; 2. Cache l , l = 1 , . . . , h, contains num cache pairs of nodes n i ,n j s.t. n i and n j belong to the l -th level of T , with n i and n j far siblings one of the other (cache balancing); 3. ∀ n i ,n j ∈Cache l , l = 1 , . . . , h, the node parent of n i and n j in the shuffle index belongs to Cache l−1 (path continuity).
Note how the path continuity requirement (Condition 3 in the definition), requesting that the parent of a cached node be also in cache and here extended to the consideration of shadows, does not impose any complication to the approach. As a matter of fact, the choice of the shadows among the far siblings of target nodes included in the cache nicely guarantees that their parent (being a target) is already in the cache by construction.
A nice advantage of including shadows in cache is that Cache l , l = 1 , . . . , h, contains 2num cache nodes, half of which are stored at S G and the others are stored at S Y . This will provide a symmetric behavior of the access at the two servers, with each of them operating with a view as if it was the only one involved in the access (see Section 5) . After the search illustrated in Section 4.2 for value e3 over the distributed shuffle index in Figure 2(b) , the cache includes the nodes in the path to e3 and their shadows (i.e., r 1 ,r 0 , e,h , and e3 ,e2 ).
Shuffling
Shuffling aims at destroying the one-to-one correspondence between blocks and nodes stored in them. The idea is to randomly re-allocate all nodes available in an access (i.e., accessed as targets, covers, shadows or in cache) so to break the otherwise static relationship between nodes and blocks where they are stored. Shuffling is formally defined as follows. Like in the original (non-distributed) shuffle index, shuffling is performed only within levels and not cross-levels, due to complications that would otherwise arise for updating pointers to children.
Also, in our distributed shuffle index, where nodes (accessed because in the paths to the target or to a cover, or present in cache) are always accompanied by a shadow, we need to ensure that shuffling does not compromise the balanced allocation of the index. We then require the shuffling to ensure balancing, as captured by the following property. T(N , ID G , ID Y , φ) be a logical index, and P = { n 1 , n 1 , . . . , n m , n m } be a set of pairs of nodes in N s.t. ∀ n i , n i ∈ P, σ(n i .id ) =σ(n i .id ). A shuffling π over ID P ={id : ∃ n i , n i ∈ P with id =n i .id or id =n i .id } is balanced iff ∀ n i , n i ∈ P, σ(π(n i .id )) =σ(π(n i .id )).
Property 2 (Balanced shuffling). Let
Balanced shuffling essentially guarantees that pairs of nodes provided as input and stored at different servers before the shuffling remain stored at different servers after the shuffling. Since we operate shuffling on pairs of nodes that are far siblings one of the other, balanced shuffling ensures that these pairs of nodes will remain as such after the shuffling (indeed, shuffling does not change the 'being child of' relationship over the abstract index). Note that this does not mean that the two nodes in a pair can only be swapped one with the other as shuffling can actually change the blocks to which they are allocated; the only constraint is that the two nodes do not end up being stored at the same server. It is then easy to see that a balanced shuffling guarantees that the shuffling does not compromise the balanced allocation of the shuffle index (Property 1).
We realize a balanced shuffling by: i) randomly shuffling the nodes allocated at each of the two servers separately; and ii) possibly swapping the allocation of a node and its shadow. The random shuffling (step i)) does not move nodes from S G to S Y or vice versa. The controlled swapping (step ii)) operates between pairs of nodes stored at the two servers: whenever a node allocated at S G is moved to S Y , its shadow (which by definition is at S Y ) is moved from S Y to S G , and vice versa. More precisely, our shuffling works as follows.
-Consider a logical index T(N , ID G , ID Y , φ), a set P = { n 1 , n 1 , . . . , n m , n m } of pairs of nodes in N , and the set ID P ={id : ∃ n i , n i ∈ P with id =n i .id or id =n i .id } of their identifiers.
-Define an intra-server shuffling over ID P , π 1 : ID P → ID P , such that ∀id ∈ ID P , σ(π 1 (id )) = σ(id ). -Randomly select a subset S of pairs of nodes in P for inter-server swapping.
-Return π over ID P such that ∀ n i , n i ∈ P:
• if n i , n i ∈ S =⇒ π(n i .id ) = π 1 (n i .id ) and π(n i .id ) = π 1 (n i .id );
• if n i , n i ∈ S =⇒ π(n i .id ) = π 1 (n i .id ) and π(n i .id ) = π 1 (n i .id ).
Note that, while guaranteeing balancing, our shuffling can move a node to any block on which the shuffling is operating (either at the same or at a different server). This provides for a fast degradation of the correspondences between nodes and blocks, ensuring the protection of access and pattern confidentiality (see Section 6) .
As an example, consider the shuffle index in Figure 2 (b), reported in Figure 3(a) for the reader's convenience, and the set P = { r 0 , r 1 ; e,h , a,c ,  b,d ; e3 ,e2 , a2 ,a1 , b1 ,b2 } of pairs of nodes accessed by the search for value e3 illustrated above. Figures 3(b) and (c) illustrate an example of intraserver shuffling π 1 over ID P and of inter-server swapping, with S={ r 0 ,r 1 ; a,c , e,h ; a1,a2 }, respectively. It is easy to see that the resulting shuffling π satisfies the balancing property (e.g., σ(r 0 .id )=S G and σ(r 1 .id )=S Y ). Figure 3(d) illustrates the shuffle index after the shuffling.
Access Execution
The application of shadows, covers, cache, and shuffling when performing an access works in combination to ensure two kinds of protection: i) obfuscating the fact that the access aims at a specific block (shadows, covers, and cache); and ii) changing the allocation of nodes so to dynamically modify the node/block correspondence and therefore provide protection for future accesses. Access execution with our protection techniques works as follows.
Given a search for a target value v, we first choose a set of num cover +1 cover searches for v (Definition 2), where the additional one is to be used if a node in the path to v is in cache. For each level l of the distributed shuffle index, we identify the blocks in the paths to covers and target and choose a shadow (Definition 1) for each of them. Like covers, shadows are chosen in such a way to ensure block diversity, meaning that they should not appear in the paths to the target and to covers, and should not be stored in Cache l . Intuitively, block diversity guarantees that all the techniques play a role in providing protection as they will not end up clashing over the same blocks.
Enforcement of block diversity also on shadows, and application of shadows to both the target and cover searches, as well as availability of shadows in cache, provide a nice symmetric behavior of the access at the two servers, with each of them observing num cover + 1 reads and num cover + num cache + 1 writes for each level of the shuffle index (but level 0). In other words, each server will observe a pattern of (read/write) accesses to blocks as if it was the only server storing the data and managing the access. Note that this does not cause any performance overhead with respect to the single server solution while enjoying significant higher protection (see Section 6).
For instance, consider the shuffle index in Figure 3(a) . Figure 4 illustrates, step by step, a search for value e3 that adopts a2 as cover and that assumes that the local cache has size one and contains the path to b1 (e.g., r 0 ,r 1 , b,d and b1 ,b2 , with d and b2 the shadows for b and b1 chosen in a previous search). Among its far siblings, h is chosen as shadow for e, c for a, e2 for e3 , and a1 Y102  Y103  G102  G104  G101  Y101  G103  Y104   G207 Y213 Y201 Y203 G210 G204 Y210 G206 G212 Y204 G205 G209 Y207 Y206 G202 Y205 Y211 G213 G201 G211 Y212 G203 Y208 Y202 Y209 G208   Y001 r0 r1
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g g g g4 e1 e2 e3 f1 f2 f3 h1 h2 h3 d1 d2 d3 d4 c1 c2 c3 b1 b2 b3 a1 a2 a3 Fig. 3 . Evolution of the shuffle index for our running example Legend: target and its shadow; • node in cache and • its shadow; cover and its shadow for a2 . The columns of the table represent: the visited level of the shuffle index (l ); the content of the cache (Cache l in Retrieved nodes) and the nodes read from the servers (Read in Retrieved nodes); the balanced shuffling (shuffle); the nodes in the cache (Cache l in Shuffled nodes) and read (Non Cached in Shuffled nodes) after the shuffling; the nodes written on the server that are also kept in cache (Cache l−1 in Written nodes) or that are only stored at the server (Non Cached P in Shuffled nodes). Note that column Cache l−1 in Written nodes l Retrieved nodes Shuffle Shuffled nodes Written nodes
Fig . 4 . An example of access to the distributed shuffle index in Figure 2 searching for e3 , with a2 as cover Legend: target and its shadow; • node in cache and • its shadow; cover and its shadow represents the status of the local cache at the end of the access. The evolution of the shuffle index for the search in Figure 4 is illustrated in Figure 3 . Figure 5 shows the observations of the servers in terms of blocks read and written by the access in Figure 4 . The different blocks read provide confusion to each of the server with respect to which is the target of the access (as a matter of fact, the observations of a server might even not include the target but its shadow); the different blocks written provide confusion over what is stored in the blocks after the access (as a matter of fact, even the set of nodes stored at each server might have changed), thus practically destroying any possibility for the servers to correlate observations over different access requests (see Section 6).
Discussion and Evaluation of the Approach
We discuss the protection guarantees and the performance of our distributed shuffle index, in particular comparing it with the original proposal [5] adopting a single server. G001   G103  G102  G101  G104   G201 G202 G203 G204 G205 G206 G207 G208 G209 G210 G211 G212 G213   Y001   Y104  Y101  Y103  Y102   Y201 Y202 Y203 Y204 Y205 Y206 Y207 Y208 Y209 Y210 Y211 Protection. Like in [5] , we focus the analysis on leaf nodes, which are more exposed than the internal ones. Indeed, internal nodes are clearly involved in shuffling operations more often than leaf nodes. Also, while in the analysis we assume the servers not to collude, we note that a possible collusion can cause a slight decrease of protection but does not cause critical breaches because the distributed shuffle index would remain protected as in the case of a shuffle index employing 2num cover + 1 covers and a double cache size. We start by noting that access confidentiality naturally increases with the use of two servers. In fact, even if no cover was to be applied, the server could have just a 50% confidence that its observations refer to blocks in the path to a target as they could just refer to their shadows. Shadows provide then a natural increase to the protection when covers are applied. The fact that shuffling operates across servers also provide a natural protection since, again, every node has 50% probability of remaining on the same server after a shuffling is applied. (Note that encryption with a different salt at every re-allocation prevents servers from making any inference on the shuffling performed.)
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To study the protection offered by shuffling, we model the knowledge of a server on the fact that a node n is stored at a given block id as a probability value P(n, id), expressing the confidence in such a knowledge, with P(n, id) = 1 corresponding to certainty and P(n, id) = 1 |N | , with N the set of leaf nodes in N , corresponding to complete absence of knowledge. We assume the worst starting case where a server knows the exact correspondence between nodes and blocks (i.e., P(n, id) = 1 when n is allocated at block id, P(n, id) = 0 otherwise) and evaluate the knowledge degradation of the server due to the shuffling performed at every access.
Let ID G ⊆ ID G and ID Y ⊆ ID Y be the sets of identifiers of the m leaf blocks accessed at servers S G and S Y , respectively. Consider also a leaf node n ∈ N and suppose that server S G knows that n is stored at one of the m accessed blocks (the same discussion applies to server S Y ). After the access, two cases can occur: i) n is still stored at server S G , or ii) n has been moved to server S Y . In the first case, for all id G ∈ID G , we have that P(n,
since there is a 50% chance for node n to remain at server S G and there are m possible blocks where the node can be stored. In the second case, node n can Every access request directed to a server has num cover =3 and num cache=1
be moved to any of the m blocks accessed at server S Y . However, server S G does not know which are the m leaf blocks accessed at server S Y . Then, for all
We performed a set of experiments for studying the degradation of the knowledge of a server at the aggregate level. These experiments evaluate the entropy of the server knowledge under different configurations (i.e., varying the number of covers and the size of the cache) with different access profiles, where access profiles have been simulated by randomly generating sequences of accesses following a self-similar 4 probability distribution with skewness γ in the range [0.25, 0.5]. We then evaluated the increase of entropy at the increase of the number of accesses for three scenarios where: 1) the shuffle index is distributed over two servers; 2) the shuffle index is distributed over two servers but the two servers collude; 3) the shuffle index is stored at a single server. Note that the second scenario has a double role, representing two different cases: 2.1) when the two servers collude (exchanging all the knowledge they have on the initial allocation as well as the knowledge on every subsequent observation); 2.2) when a single server is applied but with the use of 2num cover + 1 covers and with a cache of size 2num cache. Figure 6 illustrates the experimental results using 3 covers and a cache with size 1 for every access request directed to a server, considering a logical shuffle index with 1000 leaves, skewness γ equal to 0.5 and 0.25, and varying the number of accesses. (Experiments with different configurations presented a similar behavior.) As it is visible in the figures, in the scenario where the shuffle index is distributed over two servers (scenario 1, solid line), the entropy increases much faster than in the scenario of a single server subject to a similar workload (scenario 3, dotted line). The dashed line, reporting the entropy evolution in case of collusion (scenario 2), with respect to the other two lines tells us that: i) collusion among servers implies a slower knowledge degradation (as the servers combine their knowledge), but does not cause confidentiality breaches (since entropy remains high); ii) the use of two servers, even when such servers collude, enjoys a faster entropy increase and hence, protection guarantees, over the case when a single server is used but with the application of 2num cover + 1 covers and with a double size of the cache.
System Performance. The performance of the distributed shuffle index is based on the response time experienced by the client when submitting an access request. Among the different factors contributing to the response time, in our experimental evaluation, we observed that the latency of the network is the factor with the greatest impact in a large-bandwidth WAN scenario (which is the most interesting and natural environment for data outsourcing applications [5, 6] ).
To assess the system performance, we considered a data set of 2 GiB stored in the leaves of a shuffle index with 3 levels with nodes of 8 KiB. To properly configure the network environment, we adopted a professional-grade tool suite (i.e., Traffic Control and Network Emulation, for Linux systems) and we chose a representative WAN configuration suitable for interactive traffic, with LAN-like bandwidth and round-trip time modeled as a normal distribution with mean of 100 ms and standard deviation of 2.5 ms. Then, we compared the average response time in two different scenarios: i) our distributed shuffle index where each request accesses m leaf blocks at each of the two servers; and ii) the original (non-distributed) shuffle index where each request accesses 2m leaf blocks. The experiments considered a variety of configurations, with different values for m. The average response time in the distributed scenario is approximately 5% lower than the one obtained in the original scenario. As an example, fixing m = 3, the average response time is 380 ms in the distributed scenario and 405 ms in the original one. Our experiments also show that, in both the original and distributed scenario, the costs of adopting one additional cover search (cache element, respectively) is 1.18% (0.6%, respectively) of the average response time.
Related Work
Previous related works proposed different indexing techniques for the evaluation of queries over encrypted data (e.g., [4, 13, 14, [18] [19] [20] ). These solutions however aim at protecting data confidentiality only. Traditional approaches for protecting access and pattern confidentiality are based on PIR protocols (e.g., [2, 10] ), which however suffer from high computation and communication costs and do not provide content confidentiality. More efficient PIR solutions rely on the presence of different copies of the data stored at different servers (e.g., [1] ), and are based on the assumption that servers do not communicate with each-other.
The first approach that protects data, access, and pattern confidentiality has been illustrated in [22] and combines the pyramid-shaped hierarchy layout of the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) data structure [11] with Bloom filters. Even if this proposal adopts an enhanced reordering technique between adjacent levels of the ORAM to provide a limited amortized cost of accesses, the response time of queries submitted during the reordering of the bottom level of the structure remains linear in the database size. Different approaches try to mitigate the cost of these accesses, for instance by limiting shuffling to fetched records (e.g., [9] ); guaranteeing a constant number of interactions between the data owner and the server, independently from the number of levels in the ORAM (e.g., [21] ); introducing the support for concurrent accesses by multiple clients (e.g., [12] ). ORAM has been recently extended to the distributed scenario [16] , but its privacy guarantees rely on the presence of non-communicating servers.
The line of works most related to our is represented by solutions that provide data, access, and pattern confidentiality by exploiting dynamic data allocation, which destroys the otherwise static relationship between disk blocks and the information they store (e.g., [5, 6, 15, 23] ). The first approach adopting dynamic data allocation has been introduced in [15] and is based on a B-tree index structure. This proposal however does not guarantee pattern confidentiality. Similarly to the shuffle index [5] , the proposal in [23] adopts cover searches, repeated searches, and shuffling protection techniques to provide access and pattern confidentiality. This solution is less flexible than the shuffle index, as it does not have an underlying index structure and the number of cover searches is fixed. Our solution provides higher protection guarantees than the proposals above, since we operate in a distributed scenario. Also, with respect to distributed PIR and distributed ORAM approaches, we remove the limiting assumption that the storing servers cannot communicate.
Conclusions
We extended the shuffle index to the consideration of multiple servers. Our approach is based on distributing the index structure over two servers, and on the use of shadows for providing to each server a view as if it was the only server storing the data. The distributed index enjoys an increased protection with respect to the use of a single server while not impacting performance.
